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Abstract. We analyze the procedure providing quantum cheques
of S. R. Moulick and P. K. Panigrahi [4] to produce quantum e-
cheques, based on multiparty quantum telecommunication between
custumer and cooperated branches of bank.
AMS Mathematics Subject Classification: 15A06; 15A99
Keywords and Terms: quantum secret sharing scheme; quantum
multivariate interpolation, quantum cheques, quantum e-cheques
1. Introduction
The problem of providing a quantum code of classical cheques is a
central problem of the so called quantum money problem. The question
is to provide a scheme of quantum code in such a way that it should
be similar to the classical ones but with absolute high secrecy. In the
work [4], the authors gave an adequate survey of development of the
problem and constructed a scheme for quantum cheques. The scheme
is covered the classical version of cheques: The quantum cheque will
use the schemes of the form
∏
= (Gen, Sign, V rfy).
Some customer Alice and bank make initialation by the
Gen scheme: namely Alice came to some bank branch to open an
account with secret key as a binary L-digit number k ∈ {0, 1}L to
provide an electronique signature in the future, by using some secret
key generation scheme for Alice and bank. The bank later gives her a
cheque book serial number s. For secrecy, Alice produces some public
key pk and store a secret key sk. The bank produces 3 entangled
qubits in GHZ states
|φ(i〉GHZ = 1√
2
(|0(i)〉A1 |0(i)〉A2 |0(i)〉B + |1(i)〉A1|1(i)〉A2|1(i)〉B) , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and send two of them, namely |φ〉A1 and |φ〉A2 to Alice. Therefore Al-
ice holds (id, pk, sk, k, s, {|φ(i)〉A1 , φ(i)〉A2}) and the bank branch holds
(id, pk, sk, k, s, {|φ(i)〉B}).
The next step is the
Sign scheme:. Alice chooses a random number r with use a random
number generation procedure r ← U{0,1}L , a numeration i = 1, . . . , n
of orthogonal base |φ(i)〉 and certainly an amount M she likes to make
some transaction with bank (debit or credit), and then evaluate the
one-way funtion f : {0, 1}∗× |0〉 → |ψ(i)〉 at the concatennation x||y of
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the data as k||id||r||M ||i to provide a state ψ(i) = αi|0〉 + βi|1〉. Alice
encodes the data |ψ(i)〉 with the |φ(i)〉A1 , making them entangled and
measuring the Bell states:
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) , |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|10〉 ± |01〉)
. The system is in the states of form |φ(i)〉 = |ψ(i)〉 ⊗ |φ〉GHZ =
1
2
{|φ+〉A1(αi|00〉A2B + βi|11〉A2B) + |φ−〉A1(αi|00〉A2B − βi|11〉A2B)
+|ψ+〉A1(αi|00〉A2B + βi|11〉A2B) + |ψ−〉A1(αi|00〉A2B − βi|11〉A2B)
}
Then Alice performs Pauli transforms
|φ+〉 → I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, |φ−〉 → σZ =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
|ψ+〉 → σX =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, |ψ−〉 → σY =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
and make correction to |φ(i)〉A2 Alice makes signature by using the pro-
cedure signpk(s) and produces the quantum cheque χ = (id, s, r, σ,M, {|φ(i)A2})
then publicly send through Abby to an arbitrary of the valid branches
of the bank.
The final step is the verification
Vrfy scheme: A valid bank branch after received the cheque, informs
to the main branch in order to check the signature V fry(σ, s). For
this one uses namely the well-known Fredkin gate ([4], Picture 1). If
the (id, s) or σ is invalid, the bank destroy the cheque, otherwise the
bank continue the measurement in Hadamard basis |φ〉B. If the result
is |φ+〉 or |φ−〉 the main branch communicates to the acting banch to
continue. The acting branch perform transformation |φ+〉 → I and
|φ−〉 → σZ . The bank accepts the cheque if it passes the swap test
then destroy it.
The schemes are summarized as in the Figure 1 of [4]:
Figure 1. quantum cheques transfering code
We remark that the quantum cheque is produced and used quite sim-
ilar to the classical one. We propose therefore to use the multipartite
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quantum key distribution to make quantum cheques become quantum
e-cheques of high secrecy [2]. Our main result is Theorem 2.1 stating
that a code for quantum e-cheques can be provided with high secrecy
by the multipartite public key distribution of quantum share. The fea-
ture of our approach is that (i) Alice does not need to go to a bank
branch to do a transaction, but divides her data to a disjoint union
of parts and connects with acting branches to send to each one part
of her data, (ii) the bank can record the Alice’s data only if all acting
branches cooperate together and therefore (iii) they defense the origin
of data and Alice prevents some dishonest branches to change the data.
We separately consider the problem of e-cheque transfering in the sit-
uation of absolute secured channel in order to point out the main idea
of e-chequering. The more complicated problem of e-cheque transfer-
ing in presence of eavesdroppers in a nonserured channel or dishonest
participants will be separately considered in a subsequent paper.
We thank Prof. S. R. Moulick and Prof. P. K. Panigrahi for carefully
reading the first draft of this paper, for valuable comments and for
reminding the authors about mediator.
The paper is devoted to this construction in the next Section 2 and
finishes with some conclusion.
2. Quantum e-cheques as multiparty quantum secrete
sharing
Consider the following modified problem for the situation when Alice
does not send the quantum cheques via Abby, but could online con-
nect with acting branches of a bank. To prevent the fact that some
distrusted branches could change the cheque. The bank could discover
the informations from the quantum cheques only if all acting branches
cooperate togheter and in that case the other branches prevent the
some untrusted branches to change the contents of the cheque. The
quantum cheques in that case are what we call e-cheques.
Solution to this problem is the following scheme of code.
After the first step Gen scheme, in the second step
Sign Scheme one keeps the same as in the previous section, only now,
Alice divides the provided concatened information k||id||r||M ||i into n
parts, D
(i)
1 , . . . , D
(i)
n , where n is an appropriate number of branches in
action. Then she produces the corresponding states by using a one-way
function f to have f(D
(i)
j ) = ψ
(i)
j , for all j = 1, . . . , n. Following the
multiparty secret sharing, when the branches cooperate together and
inform to the main branch, one discover the states |φ(i)j 〉
Theorem 2.1. The quantum cheques could be with higher secrecy elec-
tronically transfered from Alice to the acting bank branches by a code of
multiparty quantum telecommunication problem of secret sharing with
quantum public key distribution.
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Proof. The theorem is proved by the following
Procedure, which is similar to the one in the 3 persons case by
Cabello [1], following which the system states are changing as follows.
|ψi〉 −−−→ |ψii〉 −−−→ |ψiii〉 −−−→ |ψiv〉
Let us consider it in more details.
Transfer Step 1. Initialization of 3n qubits. For a fixed i, Alice uses
n+ 2 qubits, named: 1, 2, 3, D1 = D
(i)
1 , . . . , Dn−1 = D
(i)
n−1: qubits 1 and
2 are entangled in Bell state, qubits 3, D1, . . . , Dn−1 are entangled in
GHZ state with n− 1 acting bank branches: Branch 1, Branch 2, ....,
Branch n-1, each has 2 entangled qubits i+3, Ci, i = 1 . . . , n−1 namely
in null state. Alice produces a Bell state measurement on qubit 1 and
2 and a Fourier measurement Fn on n qubits 3, D1, . . . , Dn−1. Each of
acting branch makes a Bell state Fourier measurement F2 of entangled
i+ 3, Ci, i = 1 . . . n− 1. At the end of this step 1, the system is in the
state
|ψi〉 = |0 . . . 0〉3D1...Dn−1 ⊗ |00〉12 ⊗ |00〉4C1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |00〉n+2,Cn−1
Transfer Step 2. Entangled Bell-state measurements. Alice sends
each qubit Di of her GHZ state out to each i
th acting bank branch of
the other n− 1 branches. The system is in the state
|ψii〉 = |AP 〉3D1...Dn−1 ⊗ |BP 〉1C1 ⊗ |CP 〉2C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |NP 〉n+2,Cn−1
Transfer Step 3. Secret Bell-state measurement. Next, Alice and
each user performs a Bell-state Fourier measurement F2 on the received
qubit and one of their qubits. After these measurements the state of
the system becomes
|ψiii〉 = |AP 〉3D1...Dn−1 ⊗ |AS〉2,3 ⊗ |BS〉4,D1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |NS〉n+2,Dn−1 ,
where |AP 〉 is n-qubit GHZ state of the standard orthonormal basis.
Transfer Step 4. Secret sharing. The n − 1 acting branches send a
qubit (the one they have not used) to Alice, and she performs a Fourier
measurement Fn to discriminate between the 2n GHZ states, and pub-
licly announces the result |AP 〉1C1...Cn−1 . After these measurements the
state of the system becomes
|ψiv〉 = |AP 〉1C1...Cn−1 ⊗ |AS〉2,3 ⊗ |BS〉4,D1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |NS〉n+2,Dn−1 ,
The result AP, and the result of their own secret measurement allow
each legitimate acting branch to infer the first bit of Alices secret result
AS. To find out the second bit of Alice’s secret AS, all users (except
Alice) must cooperate.
In case n = 3 there is an illustration of Cabello [1] as in Figure 2.
The proof therefore is achieved. 
The 4 steps scheme of public key secret sharing distribution can
be generalized to the case of two levels groupped secret sharing as
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Figure 2. Quantum cheques transfer code with n = 3
illustrated in the work of A. Jaffe, Z.-W. Liu, and A. Wozniakowsk[3]
in Figure 3:
After discovered the e-cheque, bank continue to procede the same
procedure Vrfy Scheme as in the quantum cheques scheme above to
verify the validity of the e-cheque and accept of destroy it.
3. Conclusion
We show that the quantum cheques can be electronically transfered
with higher secrecy by a code of multiparty quantum telecommunica-
tion problem of secret sharing with quantum public key distribution.
The problem of transfering e-cheques in nonsecured channel is sepa-
rately considered in a subsequent paper.
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Figure 3. n-partitie-sharing problem and correspond-
ing BVK code
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